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DELTA CONSTR. CO., INC. V. EPA: PUTTING THE BRAKES ON
CHALLENGES TO UNFAIR AGENCY REGULATION
OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND
FUEL ECONOMY IN LIGHT-DUTY
AND HEAVY-DUTY VEHICLES
I. INTRODUCTION
As the United States has modernized, the country and the
world at large have become increasingly dependent upon fossil fu-
els to transport people and goods from point A to point B.1  Ad-
vances in modern transportation initiated the invention of the
combustion engine, the heightened consumption of fossil fuels,
and ultimately, the increased output of greenhouse gas emissions
into the Earth’s atmosphere.2  Despite the world’s best efforts at
combatting increased emissions, global warming, and climate
change, at the end of September 2016, the world surpassed the four
hundred parts per million mark for carbon dioxide emitted into
the atmosphere.3  Due to significant carbon dioxide emissions,
scientists project carbon dioxide must be reduced to three hundred
and fifty parts per million “‘if humanity wishes to preserve a planet
similar to that on which civilization developed and to which life on
Earth is adapted.’”4
In an attempt to address the looming problems associated with
global warming and increased greenhouse gas emissions, Congress
passed the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1973, which granted the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) power to regulate emissions of
pollutants found to “‘endanger public health and welfare.’”5  Since
the CAA’s passing, the related EPA regulations have reduced
ground-level ozone by more than twenty-five percent, decreased
“mercury emissions by [forty-five] percent,” reduced “chemicals
1. A blanket around the Earth, NASA, http://climate.nasa.gov/causes/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 13, 2017) (describing human impact on global warming).
2. Id. (explaining industrialization’s role in increased greenhouse gases).
3. John Schwartz, A Milestone for Carbon Dioxide in the Atmosphere, THE N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2drCgBx (describing recent measurements
of carbon dioxide in Earth’s atmosphere).
4. Id. (explaining impact of surpassing four hundred parts per million
threshold).
5. The Clean Air Act, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org
/global_warming/solutions/reduce-emissions/the-clean-air-act.html#.V_6fGeArK
01 (last visited Apr. 13, 2017) (discussing Clean Air Act’s impact on environmental
regulation).
(235)
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that contribute to the hole in the ozone layer[,]” and diminished
the content of lead in gasoline, thereby reducing “air pollution by
[ninety-two] percent.”6  Despite these major accomplishments, in
2009, the EPA concluded emissions of greenhouse gases presented
a risk to human health and safety, warranting further regulation.7
These increased greenhouse gas regulations, however, directly
affect not only the manufacturers of fossil fuel powered vehicles,
but also the consumers seeking to purchase those vehicles and the
producers of alternative sources of fuel aiming to enter into a mar-
ket dominated by large, powerful oil companies.8  In Delta Constr.
Co., Inc. v. EPA,9 the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia faced
the dilemma of upholding constitutional principles of Article III
standing, as juxtaposed with the rights of potential plaintiffs to chal-
lenge regulations set forth by the EPA and National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in carrying out their obligations
under the CAA.10
In Delta Constr. Co., the D.C. Circuit Court addressed whether
two distinct groups of petitioners possessed standing to challenge
the EPA’s and NHTSA’s joint rules regulating greenhouse gas emis-
sions and fuel economy of light-duty and heavy-duty vehicles in the
United States.11  In determining that neither set of petitioners pos-
sessed the necessary Article III standing, the court found that, in
order to properly challenge joint rules having an identical impact
upon petitioners, it is necessary to (1) challenge both portions of
the rule in order to be properly redressed by the court; (2) follow
the necessary administrative procedure so that the court may prop-
erly enforce jurisdiction over the matter; and (3) ensure that the
petitioner adequately falls within the zone of interests anticipated
by the statute.12
This Casenote addresses the impact that the D.C. Circuit
Court’s decision will ultimately have on petitioners attempting to
challenge agency regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and fuel
6. Id. (emphasizing significant impact Clean Air Act has had on
environment).
7. Id. (explaining EPA endangerment findings).
8. See generally Sources of greenhouse gas emissions, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Apr. 13, 2017)
(describing impact of regulations on fuel producers).
9. 783 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
10. See generally id. at 1293-94 (explaining conflict faced by D.C. Circuit
Court).
11. See id. (describing issues court addressed).
12. See id. at 1297, 1300-01 (expounding on holding of court).
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efficiency in vehicles.13  First, this Note examines the court’s assess-
ment that a group of consumers do not have standing to challenge
only the EPA’s portion of the Car Rule, which regulates output of
greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy in passenger vehi-
cles.14  This Note also assesses whether the court’s interpretation of
causation gives appropriate weight to both the causation and the
redressability of the harm incurred by the petitioners.15  Next, this
Note considers whether the court properly applied the statute re-
quiring petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies prior to as-
serting challenges to agency regulation.16  Finally, this Note
concludes that the Court counterintuitively ruled that an alterna-
tive fuel producer did not possess Article III standing because it did
not fall within the zone of interests anticipated by the statute.17
II. FACTS
In Delta Constr. Co., Inc. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit Court decided
whether two separate groups of petitioners had standing to chal-
lenge the EPA’s and NHTSA’s “coordinated rules governing [ ]
greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy of cars and trucks.”18
In 2010 and 2011, the EPA and the NHTSA issued Final Rules
regulating greenhouse gas emissions and fuel efficiency require-
ments for light-duty and heavy-duty vehicles.19  The joint product
released in 2010 was the agencies’ Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards (Car Rule).20  These standards applied to manufacturers
of light-duty vehicles, medium-duty passenger vehicles, passenger
automobiles, and light-duty trucks (non-passenger automobiles).21
The Car Rule’s goals were to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
improve overall fuel economy in light-duty vehicles by fully imple-
13. See id. at 1297, 1300-01 (addressing effect of court’s decision).
14. See Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1296-97 (describing court’s analysis of
California Petitioners’ challenges to EPA regulation).
15. See id. at 1297 (weighing causation and redressability).
16. See id. at 1298-99 (describing analysis of whether POP Diesel met adminis-
trative requirements).
17. See id. at 1299-1300 (detailing court’s zone of interests analysis).
18. Id. at 1293 (describing decision circuit court made).
19. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1294-95 (explaining promulgation of Final
Rules for light-duty and heavy-duty vehicles).  While the EPA and NHTSA utilize
“light-duty” and “heavy-duty” to describe various vehicles, they are more easily de-
scribed respectively as cars and trucks for purposes of laymen’s terms. Id.
20. See id. (setting forth joint rules EPA and NHTSA promulgated in 2010).
21. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards, Final Rule, 75 FED. REG. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (explaining
applicability of Car Rule).
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menting technology that is already commercially applied in most
cases and is easily incorporated at a reasonable cost.22
In 2011, the EPA and NHTSA issued joint rules for medium-
duty and heavy-duty trucks, including combination tractors, heavy-
duty pickup trucks and vans, and vocational vehicles (Truck
Rule).23  Much like the purpose of the Car Rule, the Truck Rule
was designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from heavy-duty
vehicles, as well as implement “final hydrofluorocarbon standards
to control leakage from air conditioning systems in combination
tractors, and pickup trucks and vans.”24  Additionally, the Truck
Rule implemented acceptable levels for nitrous oxide and methane
gases emitted from heavy-duty vehicles.25
The EPA and NHTSA formulated the joint rules so that com-
pliance with one meant automatic conformity with the other.26  In
Delta Constr. Co., Petitioners brought multiple challenges against the
Truck Rule, as well as a collateral attack on the Car Rule.27  The
court divided the challenges based upon their subject matter and
the type of challenges each petitioner brought.28
This case concerned two groups of petitioners bringing sepa-
rate claims against the EPA’s and the NHTSA’s regulations for mo-
tor vehicle emissions and fuel economy.29  The first group of
petitioners (California Petitioners) constituted “businesses, associa-
tions, and individuals located in th[e] state [of California]” chal-
lenging specific portions of the EPA’s Car Rule and Truck Rule.30
The California Petitioners premised their argument on purchasers
of new vehicles, such as themselves, suffering from augmented up-
front costs related to these new regulations.31  The second peti-
tioner, Plant Oil Powered Diesel (POP Diesel), challenged both the
EPA’s and the NHTSA’s portions of the Truck Rule.32  As a propo-
nent of alternative fuels, POP Diesel promoted the use of vegetable
22. Id. at 25,326  (describing purposes of Car Rule).
23. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium-
and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 FED. REG. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011) (explain-
ing implementation of Truck Rule).
24. See id. (setting forth purpose of Truck Rule).
25. Id. (describing scope of Truck Rule).
26. See Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1295 (explaining compliance with one
regulation ensures compliance with both regulations).
27. Id. at 1294-95 (describing challenges set forth in case).
28. Id. at 1295 (defining division within court opinion).
29. See generally id. at 1294 (describing two sets of petitioners).
30. Id. at 1295 (explaining identity of California Petitioners).
31. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1295 (laying out California Petitioners’
argument).
32. Id. (explaining POP Diesel’s contentions).
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oil, instead of traditional fuels, and altered traditional engines to
allow them to run on vegetable oils.33  Due to the nature of the
Truck Rule, POP Diesel contended that the regulations made alter-
native fuels, such as those that they produced and used in their
modified engines, economically infeasible.34
A. California Petitioners vs. EPA
The California Petitioners asserted that the EPA did not com-
ply with the statutory duties associated with promulgating new regu-
lations.35  More specifically, the California Petitioners asserted that
the EPA failed to furnish the Science Advisory Board its greenhouse
gas emission standard prior to the issuance of the standards, as the
controlling statute mandates.36  The EPA, however, countered this
challenge by asserting that the California Petitioners do not possess
Article III standing because (1) “‘[ ] [they] ha[ve] [not] suffered
(or [are] [not] about to suffer) an injury-in-fact;”‘ (2) the EPA did
not cause the proposed injury in fact was; and (3) Petitioners are
unable to be redressed by any relief sought from the court.37
B. POP Diesel vs. EPA and NHTSA
POP Diesel asserted that “the Truck Rule ma[de] its products
economically infeasible” and challenged the validity of both the
EPA and NHTSA provisions on those grounds.38  Ultimately, POP
Diesel made three arguments as to why the Truck Rule was arbitrary
and capricious.39  First, POP Diesel argued that the greenhouse gas
emissions are measured by “how much carbon dioxide is produced
from vehicle tailpipes” with no assessment of greenhouse gasses
emitted earlier in the fuel lifecycle.40  Second, POP Diesel asserted
that the EPA’s conclusion that the Truck Rule did not necessitate
additional incentives for other biofuels was unreasonable.41  Third,
POP Diesel argued that the EPA did not consider the implications
33. Id. (setting forth POP Diesel’s background).
34. Id. (describing bulk of POP Diesel’s argument).
35. Id. at 1295-96 (explaining California Petitioners’ view about EPA emis-
sions regulation).
36. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1296 (asserting EPA violated statutory duty).
37. Id. (explaining EPA’s position regarding Petitioners’ Article III standing).
38. Id. at 1297-98 (describing POP Diesel’s contentions).
39. Id. at 1298 (explaining POP Diesel’s argument).
40. Id. (setting forth first argument of Petitioners).
41. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1298 (establishing second argument of
Petitioners).
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of the Truck Rule on economic activity, and ultimately, on green-
house emissions.42
C. D.C. Circuit Court Findings
Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit Court determined that the Califor-
nia Petitioners did not have standing to challenge both the Car
Rule and the Truck Rule.43 The court explained that the California
Petitioners were unable to attain the relief sought because rejection
of one regulation, whether it was the emissions or fuel efficiency
regulation, would not eliminate the regulation imposed by the
other rule.44  As for POP Diesel, the D.C. Circuit Court first held
that POP Diesel was unable to maintain its petition against the
NHTSA because it did not follow the proper procedures for chal-
lenging agency action; this resulted from POP Diesel’s failure to
first go directly to the agency itself before proceeding to the Circuit
Court of Appeals.45  POP Diesel’s challenge to EPA’s regulation,
however, required further examination.46  Ultimately, the court
agreed that POP Diesel did meet the requirements of Article III
standing; upon further examination, however, the court found that
POP Diesel’s assertions did not fall within the “zone of interests”
that the statute required.47  The Circuit Court, therefore, dismissed
the petitions of both the California Petitioners and POP Diesel.48
III. BACKGROUND
A. Culmination of Joint Rules Regulating Greenhouse Gases
In 1990, Congress granted the EPA the authority to regulate
emissions, including greenhouse gases, from classes of new motor
vehicles that jeopardized the public health.49  In 2009, the EPA
found that greenhouse gases “endanger the public health and pub-
lic welfare of current and future generations.”50  The EPA’s Endan-
42. Id. (explaining third argument of Petitioners).
43. See id. at 1297 (summarizing holding regarding California Petitioners).
44. Id. at 1296-97 (setting forth court’s holding as to California Petitioners).
45. Id. at 1298 (describing district court’s reasoning behind rejecting chal-
lenge of NHTSA’s regulation).
46. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1298-99 (explaining district court’s analysis).
47. Id. at 1300-01 (setting forth holding of district court).
48. Id. (setting forth overall resolution of case).
49. See 42 U.S.C.A § 7521(a)(1) (West 1990) (discussing EPA’s power to regu-
late vehicle emissions).  Vehicle emissions are encompassed in the Clean Air Act’s
definition of “air pollutant.” Id.
50. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Sec-
tion 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 FED. REG. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (describing
findings of EPA regarding greenhouse gases).
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germent Finding was met with challenges because there is no
feasible way to reduce tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions without
also reducing the amount of fuel combusted given that the two are
causally linked.51  Any rule regulating tailpipe emissions, therefore,
also limits fuel combustion, thereby curbing fuel consumption by
consumers.52
While the EPA maintains responsibility for regulating green-
house gases, the NHTSA retains authority of promulgating average
fuel economy standards that control all vehicle manufacturers.53
Due to this substantive overlap in responsibility, the two agencies
collaborated to create equivalent standards.54  These standards ap-
plied to both greenhouse gas emissions and fuel efficiency
standards.55
This collaboration spawned two separate regulations governing
greenhouse gas emissions and fuel efficiency for both light- and
heavy-duty vehicles.56  In 2010, the EPA and NHTSA passed the Fi-
nal Rule for light duty vehicles, or the Car Rule.57  The following
year, the EPA and NHTSA also passed the Final Rule for heavy-duty
vehicles, or the Truck Rule.58  While both of these rules are func-
tionally equivalent, there are slight differences between the EPA
greenhouse gas emission standards and the NHTSA fuel economy
51. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium-
and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 FED. REG. 57,124-125 (Aug. 24, 2012) (link-
ing tailpipe greenhouse gas emissions and fuel combustion and consumption in
vehicles).
52. See id. (discussing limitation of greenhouse emissions’ impact on fuel
consumption).
53. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a); 49 C.F.R. § 1.95(j) (explaining duties of NHTSA
relating to regulation of fuel efficiency).
54. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Nat’l Fuel Efficiency
Policy (May 19, 2009), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
president-obama-announces-national-fuel-efficiency-policy (disclosing collabora-
tion of EPA and NHTSA for purposes of establishing equivalent standards); see also
Presidential Memorandum, Improving Energy Sec., Am. Competitiveness and Job Creation,
and Envtl. Protection Through a Transformation of our Nation’s Fleet of Cars and Trucks
(May 21, 2010), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/
the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-regarding-fuel-efficiency-standards
(setting forth expectation that EPA and NHTSA work together to find solution).
55. Delta Constr. Co., Inc. v. EPA, 783 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(describing scope of functionally equivalent standards agencies set forth).
56. Id. at 1294 (setting forth impact of two separate standards).
57. See Light-Duty Standards, supra note 21 (explaining Car Rule and
regulations).
58. See Heavy-Duty Standards, supra note 23 (discussing Truck Rule and
regulations).
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standards due to the nature of the items that are regulated.59  De-
spite these differences, both the Car Rule and the Truck Rule are
structured so that compliance with either the emissions or fuel effi-
ciency regulations guarantees compliance with both regulations.60
B. Prerequisites to Challenging Agency Rule-Making
Some of the greatest challenges faced by petitioners seeking to
invalidate the EPA’s and NHTSA’s joint rules include meeting the
procedural requirements, or proving that they have standing to
bring the claim and that the court reviewing the petitions has juris-
diction to hear the claim.61  To meet the requirements of standing,
a petitioner must prove (1) an injury in fact; (2) that is caused by
the defendant; and (3) is redressable by court action.62  Further,
courts also must assess whether the petitioners bringing a claim
have followed the proper channels in order for the court to assume
jurisdiction.63  This often becomes complicated with administrative
agencies, such as the EPA or the NHTSA, as these administrative
agencies have their own adjudicative processes that must be ex-
hausted before seeking redress from the circuit court.64
Over time, various groups of petitioners have challenged not
only the enacted rules, but the endangerment findings; petitioners
have also challenged the EPA’s and NHTSA’s allocated power to set
forth these regulations.65  Despite these challenges, the courts have
remained reluctant to deny the constitutionality of these rules.66
1. Injury in Fact
In order to sustain a claim of standing, petitioners are required
to plead an injury in fact.67  Generally speaking, courts assert that
59. See Light-Duty Standards, supra note 21 (explaining functional equivalence
of EPA and NHTSA car standards); see also Heavy-Duty Standards, supra note 23
(explaining functional equivalence of EPA and NHTSA truck standards).
60. See Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1294 (discussing equivalence of standards
and guaranteed compliance).
61. See id. at 1294-95 (discussing procedural history of case).
62. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (establishing
elements of standing).
63. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA, 489 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(explaining courts’ lack of jurisdiction if petitioners have not followed channels
delineated in statute).
64. See id. (explaining complicated processes challenging agencies’ action
often requires).
65. See Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1294-95 (discussing prior challenges to
agencies’ respective regulations, authority, and findings).
66. Id. (establishing court’s repeated refusal to strike down regulations).
67. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (setting forth elements of standing).
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when a petitioner, himself, acts as the object of the action taken by
the defendant, there is no question as to whether standing exists.68
This issue, however, becomes more convoluted when someone or
something else is the object of the defendant’s action.69
In Sherley v. Sebelius,70 the D.C. Circuit Court determined
whether two doctors possessed standing to challenge federal guide-
lines regulating research grants for adult stem cell research.71  In
that case, the D.C. Circuit Court determined that the doctrine of
competitor standing requires the government to take action that
benefits the petitioner’s competitor, thus simultaneously injuring
the petitioner.72  Competitor standing occurs when the government
takes steps to regulate two parties with stakes in the same market;
the regulation, however, may help one of the two parties, while
harming the other.73  The D.C. Circuit Court confirmed in Sherley
that it was not acceptable for government agencies to favor one
party over another in such a way.74
Next, in White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA,75 the D.C. Circuit
addressed whether Julander Energy Company, a company engaged
in the development, exploration, and production of oil and natural
gas, possessed standing to “challenge[ ] [the] EPA’s decision not to
adopt stricter emission standards by requiring ‘fuel switching’ . . .
from coal to natural gas.”76  Ultimately, the court determined that
Julander met all of the elements of standing, and more specifically,
that it was enough to show the EPA’s action incentivizing other fu-
els to prove an injury in fact.77  Julander’s assertion of standing ulti-
mately failed, however, because it did not fall within the zone of
interests anticipated by the statute, as Julander sought to profit
from increasing the burden on other parties.78  The scope of the
68. See id. at 561-62 (explaining extent of factual basis required to prove
standing).
69. See id. (asserting when plaintiff is not object of defendant’s action, more is
required to prove standing).
70. 610 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
71. See id. at 73 (discussing facts of case and impact of holding).
72. See id. at 72 (setting forth doctrine of competitor standing).
73. Id. (explaining concept of competitor standing).
74. Id. (reiterating overall impact of Sebelius).
75. 135 S. Ct. 702 (2014).
76. Id. at 1256 (explaining factual basis and court’s analysis on Article III
standing issues).
77. See id. (explaining court’s reasoning regarding acceptance of petitioner’s
injury in fact).
78. See id. (asserting petitioner did not fall within zone of interests).
9
Peterman: Delta Constr. Co., Inc. v. EPA: Putting the Brakes on Challenges
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
244 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII: p. 235
zone of interests has since evolved due to intervention by the
United States Supreme Court.79
In Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchak,80 the United States Supreme Court assessed the scope of
zone of interests as applied to an individual’s challenge of an In-
dian tribe’s usage of tribal land under a federal statute.81  In that
case, the United States Supreme Court asserted that the zone of
interests test, assessing “prudential standing,” is not designed to be
demanding, but instead, is meant to apply Congress’s intent “‘to
make agency action presumptively reviewable’” without respect to
the applicable plaintiff.82  In further assessing its application, the
Court determined that the phrase, “arguably within the zone of in-
terests,” indicates that any doubt shall be resolved in favor of a
plaintiff; standing, therefore, is only eliminated when “‘interests are
so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit
in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress
intended to permit the suit.’”83
For example, in Assoc. of Battery Recyclers v. EPA,84 the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court assessed whether industry and environmental groups
possessed standing to request judicial review of EPA emissions stan-
dards for lead smelting operations.85  In determining that the peti-
tioners lacked standing, the D.C. Circuit Court rejected petitioners’
prudential standing.86  The court explained that when a petitioner
objects to the regulatory burdens placed not on itself, but on its
competitors, it does not satisfy the requisite zone of interests
standard.87
In the only favorable decision relating to competitor suits, Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA,88 the D.C. Circuit Court found that a fuel additive
manufacturer possessed standing to challenge an “[ ]EPA[ ] com-
pliance assurance program that established a framework for auto-
mobile makers to develop their own durability tests, subject to EPA
79. See id. (describing change of zone of interests due to evolution of United
States Supreme Court precedent).
80. 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012).
81. See id. at 2203 (describing factual basis of United States Supreme Court’s
opinion).
82. Id. at 2210 (assessing scope of zone of interests in determining prudential
standing).
83. Id. (interpreting phrasing and word choice in zone of interests test).
84. 716 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
85. Id. at 670 (discussing facts related to issue of standing).
86. See id. at 674 (setting forth court’s determination).
87. Id. (explaining court’s analysis of prudential standing).
88. 306 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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approval on a case-by-case basis. . . .”89  The court distinguished be-
tween petitioners seeking increased transparency so they, and other
manufacturers, could better meet EPA standards, as opposed to pe-
titioners seeking financial gain from additional regulation.90
2. Caused by Defendant Action
In Crete Carrier Corp. v. EPA,91 the D.C. Circuit Court addressed
the causation prong of standing when assessing whether trucking
companies were able to challenge the EPA’s 2004 standard for ni-
trous oxide and non-methane hydrocarbon emissions in the con-
text of heavy-duty trucks.92  Ultimately, the court explained that the
petitioners lacked standing because they failed to sufficiently prove
that the EPA’s standards caused their increased costs.93  To that
end, the circuit court emphasized that it was necessary for the peti-
tioners to prove that it was “‘substantially probable’” that the EPA
standards were responsible for the increased prices.94
3. Redressable by Requested Court Action
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,95 non-profit real estate developers sought review of the local
government’s refusal to change the zoning of a tract of land to al-
low for development of public housing.96  In holding that the peti-
tioners had standing, the United States Supreme Court explained
that due to the nature of their claim, it was not necessary for these
specific plaintiffs to set forth an explicit economic injury.97
Further, in Larson v. Valente,98 petitioners challenged a Minne-
sota statute requiring registration and disclosure for all charitable
organizations, including religious organizations.99  In establishing
that the petitioners did have standing, the United States Supreme
89. Id. (explaining factual basis of petitioners’ claim).
90. Id. at 1149-50 (describing court’s analysis and ultimate holding).
91. 363 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
92. Id. at 491 (discussing factual background of case and impact on issue of
standing).
93. Id. at 493 (explaining petitioners were unable to assert substantial
probability due to consent decrees).
94. Id. (setting forth “‘substantially probable’” standard necessary to prove
causation).
95. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
96. Id. at 252-53 (discussing facts of case).
97. Id. at 263 (explaining plaintiffs do not need to assert specific economic
injury to satisfy burden of standing).
98. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
99. Id. at 230-31 (setting forth factual basis of case).
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Court explained that due to the nature of the claim and its direct
impact on petitioners and other similarly situated individuals, they
did not need to prove a distinct economic injury.100
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Court’s Analysis of California Petitioners’ Article III Standing
The D.C. Circuit Court began its analysis by assessing the Cali-
fornia Petitioners’ challenge to the EPA’s greenhouse gas emissions
regulations.101  The court first addressed the arguments set forth by
both the Petitioners and the EPA.102  In addressing these argu-
ments, the court explained the controlling statute signified that any
regulations proposed under the CAA provided “‘to any other
[f]ederal agency for formal review and comment’” must be made
available to the Science Advisory Board (the Board) for review.103
The California Petitioners argued that while the EPA submitted the
standards to the Office of Management and Budget, the EPA failed
to submit the proposed regulations to the Board for review.104
Meanwhile, the EPA argued that despite the California Petitioners’
assertions, the Petitioners had not set forth an injury-in-fact because
“their allegations [were] too vague or otherwise deficient” and they
did not “demonstrate causation or redressability.”105
When it came to assessing these arguments, the court con-
cluded that there was no need to assess the California Petitioners’
injury in fact, as they had not proven causation or redressability.106
The court reasoned that the collaboration between the EPA and
the NHTSA in creating the greenhouse gas emissions standards cre-
ated regulations that were identical, and therefore, necessitated a
100. Id. at 241 (explaining petitioners’ distinct injury giving rise to finding of
standing).
101. See Delta Constr. Co. v. EPA, 783 F.3d 1291, 1293-95 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(addressing California Petitioners’ argument against EPA emissions regulations).
102. See id. at 1295-96 (explaining arguments California Petitioners and EPA
made).  The California Petitioners asserted that the EPA did not comply with their
mandatory duty to provide their proposed greenhouse gas emission standards to
the Science Advisory Board prior to their final promulgation. Id. at 1296.  The
EPA, however, argued that the California Petitioners lacked Article III standing
because they did not show an injury in fact caused by the EPA’s conduct, and thus,
could not attain the relief sought. Id.
103. Id. at 1296 (referencing language of 42 U.S.C. § 4365(c)(1) (2012)).
104. Id. (establishing factual basis of California Petitioners’ argument).
105. Id. (explaining EPA position regarding California Petitioner’s lack of in-
jury-in-fact).
106. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1296 (illustrating court’s assessment of
standing).
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challenge to both.107  As the court stressed, the California Petition-
ers challenged only the EPA regulations because the statute was not
applicable to the NHTSA.108  Even if the court struck down the
EPA’s standards, the California Petitioners were unable to be fully
redressed because the NHTSA’s nearly identical standards would
still stand.109
The court subsequently addressed that their decision in Crete
Carrier Corp. v. EPA was instructive under the present circum-
stances.110  The court explained that, in Crete Carrier Corp., like the
present case, there were two separate instruments causing price in-
creases for truck consumers.111  The court, however, opined there
must be a “‘necessary causal connection’” set forth by the Califor-
nia Petitioners in order to link the challenged standard to the “pur-
ported injury” suffered.112  The court maintained that while the
EPA’s and the NHTSA’s standards did contain slight differences,
the California Petitioners made no argument that there were dis-
tinct injuries caused by each of the separate standards, nor did they
argue that the rescission of one of the two regulations would make
a difference in vehicle manufacturers’ behaviors, such as setting
prices.113  Instead, the California Petitioners simply asserted the
standards created an “indivisible ‘National Program,’” in which
“‘the fuel economy standards cannot be bifurcated from the green-
house gas emissions standards’” that the EPA promulgated.114  The
court rejected this interpretation, explaining that nothing in the
NHTSA standards suggests that they are wholly dependent upon
the EPA’s emissions standards.115
Further, the court distinguished two of the cases the California
Petitioners cited in support of their argument.116  The California
107. Id. (setting forth district court’s rationale behind need to challenge both
agency regulations).
108. Id. (describing fatal flaw in Petitioners’ challenge).
109. Id. (describing why Petitioners cannot be redressed under present
circumstances).
110. See id. at 1296-97 (setting forth court’s analysis of Crete Carrier Corp. v.
EPA).
111. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1297 (describing factual similarities between
Crete Carrier Corp. and Delta Constr. Co.).
112. Id. (explaining Petitioner’s lack of causal link between challenged stan-
dard and injury).
113. Id. (setting forth gaps in Petitioners’ argument relating to redressability
and causation).
114. Id. (explaining Petitioners’ argument that standards created indivisible
National Program).
115. Id. (expounding on court’s rejection of Petitioners’ argument).
116. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1297 (distinguishing Petitioners’ supporting
case law from present facts).
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Petitioners cited Village of Arlington Heights and Larson for the pro-
position that injuries are redressable for purposes of discerning
standing when a favorable outcome extinguishes at least one of the
regulatory problems, even if the outcome itself redresses the in-
jury.117  The court, however, opined that these cases stood for the
premise that plaintiffs can show standing, so long as they are able to
prove that a favorable decision relieves a discrete injury to them-
selves, and therefore, “ ‘need not show that a favorable decision will
relieve [their] every injury.’”118  The court reiterated that, despite
the California Petitioners’ reliance upon these cases, they failed to
set forth evidence of a discrete injury redressable by the action re-
quested of the court.119  The court held the California Petitioners
lacked Article III standing in challenging the EPA’s greenhouse gas
emissions.120
1. POP Diesel’s Challenges to Truck Rule
Next, the court turned to POP Diesel’s various challenges
against the Truck Rule.121  POP Diesel believed the Truck Rule was
“arbitrary and capricious” because (1) “the Truck Rule measures
the greenhouse gas emissions of fuels based on how much carbon
dioxide is produced from vehicle tailpipes, ignoring greenhouse
gas impacts created earlier in a fuel’s lifecycle;” (2) the EPA’s deter-
mination that the Truck Rule did not require incentives for biofuels
because they were already incentivized by other programs was un-
reasonable; and (3) the EPA did not consider that the Truck Rule
may “lead to greater economic activity that causes a net increase in
greenhouse gas emissions.”122  The court then continued to con-
sider the challenges to each portion of the Truck Rule, dividing its
analysis based upon the entity defending the Rule.123
117. Id. (describing Petitioners’ use of Village of Arlington Heights and Larson in
comparison to Petitioners’ own case).
118. Id. at 1298 (interpreting Village of Arlington Heights and Larson).
119. Id. (applying applicable case law to Petitioners’ circumstances to demon-
strate failure in setting forth discrete, redressable injury).
120. Id. (identifying court’s holding that California Petitioners lacked Article
III standing).
121. See Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1297-98 (setting forth details of POP
Diesel’s challenge to Truck Rule).
122. Id. (explaining POP Diesel’s arguments in challenge of Truck Rule).
POP Diesel asserted that the EPA believed biofuels were already adequately incen-
tivized under the Renewable Fuel Standards Program. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(o) (setting forth incentives for alternative fuels).
123. See generally Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1298-1301 (describing organiza-
tion of court’s opinion).
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a. POP Diesel’s Challenges to NHTSA’s Standards
First, the D.C. Circuit Court addressed whether it possessed ju-
risdiction over POP Diesel’s claim against the NHTSA.124  The
court established that reviews of agency action may not be heard at
first instance unless there is a direct review statute in place granting
circuit courts subject matter jurisdiction.125
The court next addressed POP Diesel’s contention that the
court had original jurisdiction under Title 49, Section 32909(a) of
the United States Code (U.S.C.), by explaining that POP Diesel
failed to comply with the procedural requirements.126  The court
further explained that pursuant to NHTSA’s regulations under Ti-
tle 49, Section 553.35(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.), “a petition for reconsideration of a rule must be received
within [forty-five] days of the publication of the rule in the Federal
Register.”127  Additionally, the court explained that if the petition is
not received within the forty-five days allotted by the regulation, it is
treated as a petition for new rulemaking under Title 49, Section 552
of the C.F.R.128  POP Diesel, however, did not submit its petition
until fifty-nine days after the Federal Register published the Truck
Rule, leaving the NHTSA to treat the petition as if it were a petition
for new rulemaking.129  As such, because the NHTSA treated it as a
petition for new rulemaking and denied it, the D.C. Circuit Court
explained that the statute does not allow this type of direct review
of petitions in courts of appeals.130
In further assessment, the court turned to Public Citizen, Inc. v.
NHTSA, explaining that the analysis of the statute granting the
NHTSA the power to regulate fuel economy turned on the defini-
124. Id. at 1298 (explaining court’s analysis of original jurisdiction).
125. Id. (identifying rule about review of agency action).
126. Id. (establishing POP Diesel’s argument and court’s rationale for re-
jecting argument).  Specifically, Section 32909(a)(1) of the United States Code
reads:
A person that may be adversely affected by a regulation prescribed in
carrying out any of sections 32901-32904 or 32908 of this title may apply
for review of the regulation by filing a petition for review in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the
court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the person
resides or has its principal place of business.
49 U.S.C. § 32909(a)(1) (explaining who may bring action under Section
32909(a)(1)).
127. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1298 (describing NHTSA’s regulations for
filing challenges to regulations).
128. Id. (explaining consequences of not meeting forty-five day deadline).
129. Id. (establishing POP Diesel submitted petition after deadline).
130. Id. (explaining why court is unable to review POP Diesel’s petition).
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tion of “prescribing.”131  The court elaborated that, in Public Citizen,
the D.C. Circuit Court included the action of setting standards in
the scope of the definition of “ ‘prescribing,’” as anticipated by the
statute.132  The court noted that the language of Title 49, Section
32909 of the U.S.C. is substantially similar to that of the statute as-
sessed in Public Citizen in respect to the types of petitions for review
that courts of appeals may hear in the first instance.133  The court,
however, determined that because the petitions for rulemaking
were not the same as prescribing a regulation under the statute,
first instance review in the court of appeals was inappropriate.134
The court, therefore, dismissed POP Diesel’s challenge to the
NHTSA’s fuel economy regulations.135
b. POP Diesel’s Challenges to EPA Standards
In the subsequent portion of the opinion, the court assessed
POP Diesel’s challenge to the EPA’s greenhouse gas emissions stan-
dards.136  The court began by establishing that it possessed “original
jurisdiction over POP Diesel’s challenge to the EPA’s portion of the
Truck Rule. . . .”137  Still, despite this jurisdiction, the court also
addressed two other objections raised by the EPA: (1) POP Diesel’s
lack of Article III standing; and (2) POP Diesel’s failure to fall
within the zone of protected interests.138
In assessing POP Diesel’s Article III standing, the court ex-
plained that POP Diesel asserted competitor standing as allowed by
the “law of the circuit.”139  The court ruled that because POP Diesel
imported and sold jatropha oil fuel, EPA regulations injured it by
promoting other renewable fuels, which their competitors sold.140
The court compared this situation to the facts it previously adjudi-
131. Id. at 1298-99 (addressing importance of Public Citizen in scope of court’s
analysis).
132. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1298 (describing Public Citizen’s relevance).
133. Id. at 1298-99 (emphasizing similarities between statutes).
134. Id. at 1299 (explaining why petitions for rulemaking do not fall within
scope of statute).
135. Id. (asserting holding of court).
136. Id. at 1299-1301 (discussing POP Diesel’s challenge to EPA emissions
standards).
137. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1299 (explaining court has original jurisdic-
tion, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)).
138. Id. at 1299-1300 (describing two threshold objections EPA set forth).
139. Id. at 1299 (explaining competitor standing).  “The law of the circuit is
clear that ‘any one competing for governmental benefit . . . [may] assert competi-
tor standing when the [g]overnment takes a step that benefits his rival and there-
fore injures him economically.’” Id. (quoting White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1256).
140. Id. (depicting how POP Diesel could assert competitor standing).
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cated in White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, emphasizing that, like
that case, the EPA incentivized other renewable resources to the
detriment of POP Diesel.141  The court further concluded that POP
Diesel’s injury could be redressed by requiring the EPA to provide a
provision that incentivized vegetable fuels, in addition to those re-
newable resources that the regulations already incentivized.142
Next, the court assessed whether POP Diesel fell within the
zone of interests protected by Title 42, Section 7521 of the U.S.C.143
The court reiterated that the purpose of the zone of interests test is
to assess whether statute authorizes the petitioner to bring suit
against the defendant.144  The court further asserted that the zone
of interests test under the Administrative Procedure Act is not de-
manding, but the scope of the zone of interests is specifically de-
pendent upon the provisions of law under analysis.145  Specifically,
the court stated, “ ‘[W]hat comes within the zone of interests of a
statute for purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative
action under the ‘generous review provisions’ of the APA may not
do so for other purposes.’”146
Despite the “‘generous review provisions,’” the court elabo-
rated that previously, a petitioner’s interest in increasing the regula-
tory burden on others was not within the prescribed zone of
interests protected by the CAA.147  The court further explained that
this rings true even when the goals of increasing the regulatory bur-
den are directly in line with the purpose of the statute.148  The
court then compared the facts of the present case with those of
White Stallion, in which the petitioner was outside the zone of inter-
ests because it stood to economically benefit from the increased
burden on other similarly-situated parties.149  Despite POP Diesel’s
noble cause of marketing, selling, and implementing renewable
141. Id. at 1300 (describing injury of POP Diesel).
142. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1299-1300 (outlining how POP Diesel’s in-
jury may be redressed).
143. Id. at 1300 (explaining court’s analysis of zone of interests).
144. Id. (setting forth purpose of zone of interests inquiry).
145. Id. (explaining scope of zone of interests).
146. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997)) (differentiating
between what falls within zone of interests for purposes of obtaining judicial review
of administrative action under APA versus other types of judicial review).
147. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1300 (explaining goal of increasing regula-
tion of industry group does not fall within zone of interests that statute
contemplates).
148. Id. (asserting increase of regulatory burden not within zone of interests,
regardless of whether petitioners’ goals fall in line with CAA).
149. Id. (explaining why petitioners in White Stallion fell outside zone of
interests).
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fuel alternatives, as well as its intention for all renewable fuel pro-
moters to be similarly situated, the court held that its potential eco-
nomic benefit from court action placed it outside the zone of
interests for purposes of the CAA.150
Despite POP Diesel’s efforts to distinguish White Stallion by
characterizing itself as an “‘unusually suitable champion,’” the
court remained reluctant to accept that assertion.151  The court ex-
plained that it has routinely refused to accept that corporate inter-
ests deemed to be “green” fall within the zone of interests.152
The court did note one instance in which it allowed a competi-
tor’s suit challenging EPA emission regulations to proceed; this
case was Ethyl Corp. v. EPA.153  The court, however, opined in that
instance, the petitioners sought regulation that would “‘help it de-
velop and improve its products with an eye to conformity to emis-
sions needs’” and “‘secur[e] EPA approval for its own fuel additive
products.’”154  The court elaborated that the petitioner’s goal in
that case was to better conform to the statute and not increase the
regulatory burden on competitors or achieve economic gain
through legislative means.155  In dismissing POP Diesel’s challenge
of the EPA’s regulations, the court explained that “[m]erely seek-
ing to boost sales of a particularly green product, however, is not
sufficient.”156
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Throughout its analysis of both the California Petitioners’
claim against the EPA and POP Diesel’s claims against the EPA and
NHTSA, the court looked to the language of the regulations at is-
sue, similar statutes, and rulings in the D.C. Circuit Court and the
United States Supreme Court.157  The D.C. Circuit Court’s determi-
nations that (1) the California Petitioners had no standing to chal-
150. Id. (describing court’s analysis of why POP Diesel falls outside zone of
interests).
151. Id. at 1301 (describing POP Diesel’s “unusually suitable champion” argu-
ment).  The main thrust of POP Diesel’s argument was that its products were espe-
cially suited to “‘reduc[e] overall fuel consumption and greenhouse gas
emissions.’” Id.
152. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1301 (describing court’s repeated refusal to
extend zone of interests to “green” corporate interests).
153. Id. (carving out exception to general rule regarding zone of interests).
154. Id. (delineating difference between POP Diesel’s goal and petitioners’
goal in Ethyl Corp.).
155. Id. (asserting difference between two cases).
156. Id. (setting forth holding of D.C. Circuit Court).
157. See generally Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1296 (explaining analysis D.C.
District Court employed).
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lenge the EPA’s portion of the Car Rule and that (2) the court
lacked original jurisdiction over POP Diesel’s claim against the
NHTSA followed logically from the rules governing standing and
the statutes at issue.158  Despite this rational analysis, the court then
determined that POP Diesel did not have standing to challenge the
EPA’s portions of the Truck Rule.159  Not only is this holding con-
trary to the purpose of the statute, it is also counterintuitive because
it bars plaintiffs with interests aligned with the EPA, such as POP
Diesel, from challenging regulations that may hinder their ability to
create new solutions to diminish humans’ carbon footprint.160
A. California Petitioners’ Causal Link Inadequate
As the D.C. Circuit Court observed, because the two regula-
tions are functionally identical, there is no way to discern whether it
is the EPA emissions regulation or the NHTSA fuel economy regu-
lation that caused harm to the California Petitioners.161  Following
logically from that, there is, consequently, no way to redress the
injury if only one of the regulations is struck down.162  Regardless,
the California Petitioners would be left in the same position as they
were in before challenging the regulation.163  It would have been
illogical for the D.C. Circuit Court to hold otherwise.164  Beginning
with the elements of standing, the court dissects specifically why the
California Petitioners lacked the essential element of causation.165
Honing in on the element of causation, the court used a com-
mon sense approach to discern that the California Petitioners
lacked standing.166  In doing so, the court correctly asserted that
their previous decision in Crete Carrier Corp. v. EPA was instructive in
that it contained substantially similar facts to the case at hand.167
Analogizing those facts to the present facts, the court reaffirmed its
original holding that when a separate action causes the same harm,
158. Id. (describing court’s analysis).
159. Id. (describing court’s analysis).
160. Id. (elaborating on court’s inconsistencies with statute’s purpose).
161. Id. at 1296 (setting forth analysis of causation).
162. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1296 (explaining Petitioners could not be
redressed if only one regulation struck down).
163. See id. (describing conundrum of Petitioners being left in same position,
regardless of whether court strikes down EPA regulation).
164. Id. at 1297, 1300-01 (setting forth court’s holding).
165. Id. at 1296 (dissecting Petitioners’ standing).
166. See generally id. at 1296-97 (describing court’s reasoning).
167. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1296-97 (explaining application of standard
in Crete Carrier Corp. to present case).
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it is up to the petitioner to establish a causal connection between
the action and their specific harm.168
In holding that the California Petitioners had no standing due
to their lack of causation, the court continued to uphold a long line
of cases requiring petitioners to explicitly establish their standing to
bring a claim against governmental agencies.169  Despite the likely
annoyance that results from frustrated petitioners, like the present
Petitioners, the D.C. Circuit Court has been consistent in holding
that all three elements of standing must be met in order to pass this
threshold inquiry.170  In doing this, the court has maintained that
remotely related harms that occur as a result of multiple statutory
schemes must be proven to be directly related to the challenged
regulation in order to satisfy the element of causation.171
The court’s most forceful point, however, is that there are two
separate and distinct rules at play in this particular circumstance.172
This notion provided an opening for the California Petitioners to
plead that the differences in the two rules created distinct harms
that are suffered only by the employment of one rule versus the
other.173  As the court accurately points out in its opinion, the Cali-
fornia Petitioners did not take this path.174  That being said, it ap-
pears that the court created an opening in this case where, if a
petitioner were to plead that there was a distinct harm created by
one rule versus the other, the court would be open to entertaining
the claim.175  This opening has seemed to create an outlet for frus-
trated petitioners to challenge joint agency rules, or at the very
least, allows them to bring forth a claim that will not be automati-
cally dismissed due to lack of standing.176
B. POP Diesel Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
In determining whether the court possessed original jurisdic-
tion over POP Diesel’s claim against NHTSA, it employed a method
of statutory interpretation utilizing the explicit language of the stat-
168. Id. at 1297 (applying Crete Carrier Corp.’s analysis to case).
169. Id. at 1296-98 (describing court’s adherence to previous case law).
170. Id. (reiterating court’s consistent holdings).
171. Id. (elaborating on court’s reasoning).
172. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1297 (explaining court’s most compelling
argument).
173. Id. (setting forth court’s interpretation of language within rules).
174. Id. (rejecting California Petitioners’ argument and asserting Petitioners
did not use court’s proposed tactic).
175. Id. (describing opening court created in analysis).
176. Id. at 1297 (elaborating on impact of opening court created).
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ute, the language of similar statutes, and previous cases tried in the
circuit.177  The court ultimately rejected POP Diesel’s contention
that it fell under Title 49, Section 32909(a)(1) of the U.S.C., as its
petition for reconsideration was not filed within the explicit time
limit under the statute.178  In justifying its position, the court em-
phasized its previous decision in Public Citizen, which discussed the
interpretation of the word “prescribing” as was used in that NHTSA
statute.179  The court deemed that definition applicable under this
set of facts as well.180
While POP Diesel raised a plausible argument, the court took
care to analyze the statute at hand and explain why POP Diesel’s
argument fails.181  In light of the court’s application of Public Citi-
zen, it is unrealistic to expect the court to make an exception for
POP Diesel when previous petitioners faced nearly the same set of
facts and the court rejected original jurisdiction in those cases.182  It
is inequitable to allow POP Diesel to avoid the obligations the stat-
ute imposes, but force others to comply.183  In providing consis-
tency and equity, the court produced a decision, which is in line
with its previous interpretations of the word “prescribing,” as it ap-
plies to the statute, and forces POP Diesel to comply with the proce-
dural requirements of the statute.184
C. Court’s Application of Zone of Interests Test
Counterintuitive
Despite the court’s finding of original jurisdiction over POP
Diesel’s claims against the EPA, it was necessary for the court to
assess the threshold objections of whether POP Diesel possessed Ar-
ticle III standing and fell within the zone of interests contemplated
177. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1298 (setting forth court’s analysis of origi-
nal jurisdiction).
178. Id. (applying NHTSA regulation, requiring receipt of petition within
forty-five days, to facts of case).
179. Id. (laying out court’s application of Public Citizen as controlling prece-
dent interpreting term “prescribing”).
180. Id. at 1298-99 (explaining court’s adoption of Public Citizen’s analysis in
case).
181. See generally id. at 1298-99 (describing court’s careful analysis of why POP
Diesel’s standing argument failed).
182. See Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1298-99 (elaborating on why court’s
deviation from Public Citizen is unrealistic).
183. See generally id. (describing effect of denial of petition for rulemaking).
184. Id. (describing court’s application of legal principles consistent with rele-
vant precedent).
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by the statute.185  The court determined that POP Diesel had Arti-
cle III standing to bring a claim; the court, however, rejected POP
Diesel’s contention that it fell within ambit of the zone of interests
contemplated by the statute because POP Diesel’s interests were di-
rectly in line with the EPA’s interests.186  In rejecting POP Diesel’s
arguments relating to zone of interests, the court determined that
POP Diesel’s economic interest in increasing the burden on its
competitors eliminated its ability to fall within the zone of
interests.187
Generally, it would make sense to attempt to avoid an industry
group benefitting from increased regulation; in this case, however,
it is counterintuitive.188  POP Diesel is an environmentally friendly
producer of biofuels and its interests align perfectly with those of
the statute.189  The mere fact that its challenge of the EPA’s regula-
tions would positively impact POP Diesel economically has no bear-
ing on its genuine motives of promoting environmentally friendly
fuel alternatives.190  Although the court attempts to follow prece-
dent, this is a situation where it should have developed an excep-
tion, or at the very least, considered how its decision impacts the
ability of inventors of renewable resources to challenge EPA
regulations.191
VI. IMPACT
The D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Delta Constr. Co. increases
the burden upon any petitioner seeking to challenge emissions reg-
ulations.192  More importantly, however, it places an impossible bur-
den upon producers of alternative fuels, who stand to lose the most
from unfair regulations that incentivize some portions of the mar-
ket, but not others.193  While it is intuitive that these industry
groups would likely be the best equipped to challenge agency regu-
lation, recent decisions have barred their entry into the proper fo-
185. Id. at 1299 (explaining court’s analysis of POP Diesel’s claims against
EPA).
186. Id. at 1300 (determining POP Diesel does not possess Article III
standing).
187. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1300 (establishing POP Diesel’s economic
interests preclude group from challenging EPA’s regulation).
188. Id. (describing court’s rationale).
189. Id. (defining POP Diesel’s purpose and goals).
190. Id. (elaborating on court’s rationale for rejecting POP Diesel’s
standing).
191. Id. at 1300 (describing court’s adherence to precedent).
192. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1301 (describing overall impact of decision).
193. Id. (describing impact specific to alternative fuel producers).
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rums to make any progress.194  While the court in Delta Constr. Co.
sought to prevent alternative fuel producers from challenging these
regulations, the court inadvertently prevented nearly anyone from
being able to challenge the regulations by requiring petitioners to
jump through a number of procedural hoops and to fall within the
arbitrary zone of interests.195  Not only are these requirements frus-
trating, but they also create increased costs for small, alternative
fuel producers, who often are still trying to get their businesses off
the ground.196
The procedural requirements imposed by the court are two-
fold.197  Not only must petitioners be sure to add all of the appro-
priate defendants to the action, but they must also be sure to
comply with all of the administrative red tape required by the agen-
cies.198  While the D.C. District Court was reasonable in explaining
that the California Petitioners could not establish standing because
they lacked redress by only naming one of the two agencies who
promulgated the regulations, the court itself raised the possibility
that there could be a separate, distinct injury that may have been
contemplated by the California Petitioners; the court, however, re-
fused to entertain that idea.199 In rejecting this notion, the court
explained that the California Petitioners did not address any facts
that led them to believe there was a distinct injury the court could
redress, and therefore, dismissed their claim.200  This places an ex-
traordinary burden upon petitioners to either carefully plead their
injuries, so as to specify that there is, in fact, a separate, distinct
injury the court can redress, or add each and every possible defen-
dant that may have their own set of rules impacting regulation.201
Despite this burden, the court did not absolutely foreclose similarly
situated petitioners from establishing standing, and therefore, it is
likely that in the future, petitioners could utilize this tactic to defeat
defendants’ challenges to petitioner standing.202
194. Id. (elaborating how recent decisions impacted producers of alternative
fuels’ ability to challenge agency regulation).
195. Id. (explaining rare occasion when court permitted standing).
196. See generally id. at 1300-01 (elaborating on impact of court’s decision).
197. Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1300-01 (describing court’s procedural
requirements).
198. Id. (setting forth requirements imposed by court’s decision).
199. Id. at 1297 (describing court’s interpretation of alternative arguments).
200. Id. (noting court’s assessment of facts).
201. See generally id. at 1297 (explaining impact of court’s rejection of Califor-
nia Petitioners’ arguments).
202. See Delta Constr. Co., 783 F.3d at 1297 (noting future petitioners’ avenue
for litigation).
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Further, the court has established a precedent that individuals
challenging the regulations must fall within the zone of interests of
the statute.203  The court’s rejection of POP Diesel as a qualified
member of the zone of interests was troubling.204  While POP Die-
sel had met every other requirement in bringing suit, they were still
barred entry merely because they could possibly economically bene-
fit from the increased regulation of other industry entities.205
Thus, this decision will have a lasting impact on these environmen-
tally-friendly fuel producers, prohibiting them from being able to
have a real say in regulations that are often not directly targeting
them, but still have a lasting impact on both their businesses and
ability to produce alternative fuels.206  This holding directly defeats
the purpose of challenging regulations.207  Those who are directly
affected by the issues facing the alternative fuel market are barred
from even stepping foot into a courtroom, leaving them with no
other option.208
As a result, producers of alternative fuels will undoubtedly suf-
fer from increased frustration and costs.209  The D.C. Circuit
Court’s decision in Delta Constr. Co. has only made it more difficult
for these businesses to challenge regulations that place further
hardship on them or unfairly benefit their competitors.210  With
greenhouse gasses constituting a looming problem for the world-
wide community, it is necessary for the courts to examine the widely
spread impact their decisions may produce upon these green busi-
nesses that may very well be the future of our fuel consumption.211
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203. Id. at 1300 (detailing court’s established precedent).
204. See id. (describing court’s analysis).
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